Historian & Political Scientist
Scientific Advisory Board Member, Research Institute for Mezalim
From the 1830ies military relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany, in this case Prussia, evolved. The later chief of the Prussian General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, was one of the first who not only instructed the Ottoman army but also brought new knowledge of Turkey and the Ottoman army to Central Europe. His small volume “Letters from Turkey” first edited in 1839 in Berlin, still makes worthwhile reading.1
With Moltke began a longer chain of German general staff and advisory officers, who operated in Turkey: correctly speaking, the Ottoman Empire. The last and very important mission was the “Liman von Sanders Mission” in 1913, which caused a lot of diplomatic complication.2 After the Congress of Berlin in 1878 relations became closer and German economic interests and influence in the Ottoman Empire were increasing too, one of the most famous projects being the BerlinBaghdad-railway.3 German companies invested a lot of money in Turkey but, apart from this, no one took a closer interest in the Caucasus region.
But why start with the Turkish perspective when dealing with the Caucasus question? For the simple reason that the Caucasus question became crucial in the Germano-Osman relations during WW-1, including the question of the ethnical and religious “minorities”, whom nobody has taken an interest in during the pre-WW-1-period.
After the treaties of 1828 with Persia and the 1877 peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsar, the Caucasus region belonged to the Russian Empire. With the economic upturn of the early 20th century, the oil-production of the Baku region and the investments of German companies raised a little bit more interest in the Caucasus – manganese for example came from there for German industry. This was indispensable for the production of high quality steel needed for militarypurposes. Some German entrepreneurs, like Max von Oppenheim or Mr. Mannesmann were interested in the development of economic relations with Persia, India and Afghanistan and they took a closer look at the Caucasus region. Some of them tried to draw the attention of the political and military leaders of the German Empire to this region too but without substantial success.
With the outbreak of World War One, the situation changed fundamentally and with the new Ottoman lliance the Caucasus region moved into the focus of the German supreme command – “Oberste Heeresleitung.” The German Empire supported the Ottomans with a lot of subsidies, military advisers and awar material as far one was able to transport it to Turkey. One tried to get in contact with Georgian and Armenian expatriots in Europe and draw attention to the strategic possibilities of the region as a transit area to British territory in Afghanistan and India. More or less well-known is the Niedermayer Expedition to Afghanistan, to provoke the Emir to rebellion.4
With the disastrous result of Enver Pashas Caucasian winter campaign in 1914/15, any Ottoman approaches for military advance in the region failed. Huge parts of Armenia and the Black Sea coast were occupied by the Russian army for roughly three years. But the special attention of German instructors and staff officers in the Turkish high-command, like Liman von Sanders, von der Goltz Pascha, Admiral v. Souchon or Hans v. Seeckt etc was focused on other theatres of war like the Dardanelles, Palestine, Mesopotamia or the Suez campaigns in 1916, which ended ultimately with the Turkish retreat after the 3rd Gaza-Battle (Nov. 1917). One of the participants in this campaign was the German lieutenant-colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein (1870-1948), whose report about the Caucasus campaign, based on his diaries, will be the most important source, upon which this article is based.5 With the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the dissolution of the Russian Caucasus front, the situation changed fundamentally. One of the aims of the German general staff became the destabilization of Transcaucasia to undermine the Russian war efforts in general. During the war the question of the ethnical and religious minorities in Ottoman Empire was ometimes raised but there was no real German interest in risking the disruption of the alliance with the Ottoman Empire.6
Beyond this, contradictory information reached Berlin and there was no serious interest in this question. One recognized the huge number of casualties under the Armenians in 1915/16 but there was no serious intention of blaming the Ottoman ally for this.7 Sometimes, public opinion reacted while Pope Benedict XV. and the Archbishop of Cologne articulated their concern. At least some rumours about the Armenian 1918 March massacres in Baku and the whole transcaucasian region reached Germany. But the overwhelming opinion is expressed in one dispatch, written by Colonel v. Seeckt, the German chief of staff to the Ottoman army:
„In face of the obvious relations between the Armenians and the English, the Armenians could only be regarded as our enemies. It’s impossible to support Armenian interests while remaining in an alliance with the Turks. From my point of view there is, in face of the necessities of war, no reason for any regret or grace – neither Christian nor sentimental, nor political.” [English translations by the author].8
There is some more evidence for this position: As Count Bernstorff reported: „there is no difference between Turks and Armenians, the majority tries to kill the minority …”9 And similar sounds a dispatch, written by the German consul in Erzurum, Dr. Bergfeld: „the Armenians supported marauding crowds – there is no reason for any sympathy with the Armenians.10 But there is concern too. Kress von Kressenstein mentioned the evil treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish authorities, and the general religious and ethnical tensions in the transcaucasian region.
As a consequence of the military weakness of the Russians, Ottoman troops made a number of advances in the Caucasus region after the armistice of Erzincan from Dec. 1917 until the end of the peace negotiations between the central powers and the Soviets in early March 1918. The treaty of Brest-Litowsk was signed and ratified by all central powers, including the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the frontier ines in the Caucasus were no longer clearly defined. The Ottoman Empire aimed to regain the 1877 borders. From this moment onwards, the Caucasus question becomes controversial between the two allies, Germany and Turkey. The positions of the other allies, Bulgaria and the Habsburg Empire are not so important here but there were some links between Caucasian and Balkan-questions such as the Dobrudscha treatment.
The German policy objectives changed from destabilization of Russia to gaining influence in the Caucasus to prevent any Ottoman aspirations of the 1877 borders or any expansion, to compensation for the losses in Arabia and Mesopotamia, as Enver Pasha envisaged it. The real story of the German Caucasus activity began with the declaration of independence of the very episodic “Transcaucasian Federal Republic” the 22nd of April 1918, which one month later was divided into three parts: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidschan. At this stage – exactly the 29th April – the German state department – Auswärtiges Amt – produced instructions for the negotiations with Transcaucasia and Ottoman Empire. But the March massacres were in no way recognized by leading German actors Furthermore, there was a discussion among the German authorities on how to proceed further. The points of view of the state department, the German supreme command, the Secretary of the Exchequer and some other civilian and military protagonists, likewise the admiralty, were totally at odds with one another.
Despite the threatening military situation for the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans tried to regain the 1877 border in the region by military means: they moved military personal and equipment, which was much more needed in Palestine and Mesopotamia, to the Caucasus. During the following months an operetta-like scenario developed which seriously burdened the alliance of the central powers. One has to take into account the fact that the military and the political situations were incredibly confusing. There was no evidence that the Bolshevik government in Russia would survive the next three months, let alone what would happen in the Caucasus itself. The first sign of chaos was the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Republic.
From the German point of few, the situation was as follows: Diplomatic: one wanted to calm the situation in Russia to avoid any new military adventures on the eastern front and to prevent a reconciliation between Soviet-Russia and the entente powers. In addition, one detected the opportunities to undermine the British position in Persia, Afghanistan and India using the Caucasian bridgehead. Military: the German high command wanted to gain major influence in the region to secure the maritime superiority at the Black Sea, to find an opportunity to increase the German military presence in the Caspian Sea, to prevent an Ottoman expansion in the region and – most important – to obtain huge quantities of Baku-Oil for the German navy and petrochemical industries as soon as possible. Insofar, the Germans were ready to risk frictions and ruptures with the Ottoman ally at any level. At least: prepare the Caucasus as a “springboard” for military interventions against India and the other British possessions.11 Economic: one was intensively occupied with getting access to, influence over and the possibility to exploit exclusively the natural resources of the region: oil, manganese, different kinds of metals and cotton. 12 Religious/ethnic: There was a preference for the christian Georgians but there was not so much understanding and interest for the religious questions, and no consequent strategy concerning Islam.13
In this situation the Germans started an ambiguous play with Ottoman, Caucasian and Soviet partners/opponents to secure Baku-Oil for the benefit of German warfare. The Vice-Chief of the German general staff, General Erich Ludendorff, decided to start a “German military mission”, a kind of expeditionary force, to Transcaucasia.14 He selected the previously mentioned General Kress v. Kressenstein, a “Bavarian”15 aristocratic officer with a lot of “Ottoman experience”, as the head of the mission. Unfortunately, there were many obvious tensions between the secretary of foreign affairs and the supreme command. Hence, Kress did not receive clear instructions for his mission when he left Berlin. As such, no coordinated approaches by the various German players developed and there were by no means harmonized actions between the four central powers.
Ludendorff told him “… there cannot be any agreement between us and the secretary of foreign affairs – they don’t think German”16 – bad preconditions for a mission of this sort but Kress was familiar with complicated situations such as this. Kress defined the German Caucasus mission as follows:
1. Maintain security and public order, especially in Georgia and Armenia as the Christian parts of Caucasus
2. Prevent any territorial aspirations of the Ottomans in contradiction to the terms of the Treaty of Brest
3. Organize and secure the preconditions for the exploitation of the Caucasian resources for German warfare. Especially get as much oil from Baku as possible, and therefore get control over the Transcaucasian railway system in the triangle Batumi – Baku – Djolfa (Persian border).
4. Organize and build up from the scratch a Georgian army.
As a military authority, in May he was equipped with two battalions of infantry, some artillery and the omplete supporting components for transport, communication etc. necessary for an operation like this, approximatively 5.000 men, a number which increased by September to nearly 20.000 – a powerful military instrument in a chaotic region without any accepted authority.17 In his entourage he collected specialists for economic and technical questions and some men experienced in Oriental politics and languages. It would be fruitful, interesting and in some regards bizarre to say something more about Kress’ Experiences during his mission – I recommend the perusal of his diaries. As a gentleman Kress was able to deal discreetly and tactfully with various constellations and he was able to manouvre between all the protagonists of the region: Soviets/Russians, Ottomans, Georgian aristocrats, Armenian businessmen, Azerbaidjanian oil-magnates, and to incorporate the divergent views of the German authorities in Berlin, the supreme headquarter, the German embassy in Constantinople and the German military plenipotentiaries there.
The city of Baku and the oil-industries around it were the main target of the approaches of the different protagonists: Russians, Germans, Ottoman and British troops. There was no proof whether the “Red Army” would be able to hold the Baku-position but Germany signed a secret additional-commitment with the Soviets in late August – an enormous affront against their Ottoman ally. Clause 14 stated: “Germany won’t support any third power in military operations in Caucasus” and “third” meant in this constellation, Ottoman Empire. Beyond this, the German Empire gave a guarantee for the possession of Baku. In compensation, the Soviets hadto deliver 75 percent of the Baku oil production to the Germans. Unfortunately, the pipeline from Baku to Poti ceased to function after May and the capacities of the Transcaucasian railroads were disastrously reduced by a lack of oil (Masut).18
Osman-German relations were dominated by three topics in this fundamental struggle: firstly the possession of Baku, secondly the control of the Transcaucasian railways, including the connecting track via Djolfa to Täbris, and thirdly the more general question of the frontiers, not to mention the German concern about pan-turanian aspirations. Insofar, the situation sharpened during the summer 1918 as Turkish authorities tried to undermine the Kress mission on the governmental level. Relations between Berlin and Constantinople were never worse than in these days.19 Meanwhile Baku was being taken by weaker English troops under General Dunsterville operating from the Caspian Sea coast but the Germans tried to prevent the Turks from reconquering the city. Ludendorff explicitely commanded Kress to regain Baku using German troops.20
To make a long story short: finally, Osman-Muslim-Aserbaidjanian troops conquered Baku (15th sept. 1918) and they sacked the city and massacred parts of the population plus some Germans and Russians too … During this short period of Ottoman possession of Baku, a German-Ottoman treaty confirmed German influence but without any important delivery of oil for German warfare. Fate changed rapidly against the central powers, and, with the Armistice of Mudros 30th of October 1918, the Caucasian adventure ended fruitlessly with the retreat of the Turkish troops. After the armistice of Compiègne 11th November 1918 the German Military Delegation received the order from the German supreme command to leave the Caucasus but it took two more months until Kressenstein left Tiflis with the rest of his troopson 7 th of January 1919.
One Conclusion: The Caucasus was not only a minor theatre of war in the framework of the policy of the central powers. It shows the close relationship between national, social, economic and religious topics. For the German supreme command and the diplomacy of Germany and the Habsburg-Empire it was difficult to judge the situation in the Caucasus correctly because of inadequate means of communication. Thus, it was a challenge for all participants to act effectively. It is simple to criticize this in retrospect after a century but I have tried to look at events with the “eyes of the time,” a saying of the famous German historian, Leopold von Ranke.
It is worthwhile to have a short look at the mass of treaties concerning economic questions, which were signed during the short period of the Kressensteinmission. They give a glimpse of German interests and the way they wanted to enforce these.21 Unfortunately these topics are underexposed in German historical research over the last 30 years since the studies of Baumgart and Bihl, but there is a large field for new approaches beside the German obessions with the so called “Armenian Genocide” of 1915 which has dominated German research in a quite insane manner. At least: There is no evidence of any influence of these WW-1 experiences on the German plans of WW-2. But as far as one can see, a continued interest in the resources and strategicimportance of the region for German warfare remained e.g. the German campaign of summer 1942 intended to regain control of Caucasian oil und to undermine British influence in Persia and the Middle East. Presumably, the pro German feeling of the people of the region was recognized. To conclude: the ethnical constellation, the aim to exploit the natural resources and the geostrategic location of the Caucasus remained a stimulating subject of discussion both for German politicians and military thinkers.
Appendix:
1 MOLTKE, Helmut: Unter dem Halbmond. Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei in den Jahren 1835-1839. Tübingen 2016.
2 Cf. WOLF, Klaus: Gallipoli 1915. Das deutsch-türkische Militärbündnis im Ersten Weltkrieg. Sulzbach 2008. P. 19-20.
3 Cf. MCMEEKIN, Sean: The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power.Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 2010.
4 VOGEL, Renate: Die Persien- und Afghanistan-Expediton Oskar Ritter von Niedermayers 1915/16 [Studien zur MilG u. Konfliktforschung 8] Osnabrück 1976.
5 KRESSENSTEIN, Friedrich v.: Meine Mission im Kaukasus. [Nachdruck, Tiflis 2001] Orig. 1943 based upon his diaries.
6 One must consider the horrendous daily front line losses of around 6000 men. These must be seen in the context of a massacre “deep inside Turkey” in which 50000 were massacred, which amounted to no more than the average front line losses of ten days.
8 BIHL, S. 71. General v. Seeckt wrote in favour of the Ottoman ally: „Die Verbindung der Armenier mit den Engländern ist offenkundig. In diesem Augenblick dürfen wir uns der Armenier nicht annehmen, sondern müssen sie als Feinde betrachten. Es ist ein unmöglicher Zustand, mit den Türken verbündet zu sein und für die Armenier einzutreten. Meiner Meinung nach muss jede Rücksicht, christliche, sentimentale und politische, gegenüber einer harten aber klaren Kriegsnotwendigkeit verschwinden.“
9 BIHL, S. 71. Count Bernstorff, German ambassodor in Constantinople reported: there is no good will amongst Turks and Armenians: „Wer in der Majorität ist, schlägt die Minderheit tot“ which is how the Armenians also dealt with the Turks – In Turkey there was no sympathy, neither for ones own starving troops, let alone for the Armenians or anybody else.
10 Reports with very varying contents reached Berlin. Dr. Bergfeld, German consul in Erzurum, for example,
reported that the Armenians had supported plundering robber bands which forced and justified their explusion. The Armenians are in no way symphatetic „wiesen kaum einen sympathischen Zug auf“.
11 KRESSENSTEIN: p. 31. „ … im Kaukasus das Sprungbrett für eine allfalsige später Unternehmmung gegen Indien zu schaffen.“
12 BIHL, p. 91. HINDENBURG to SEECKT: 12 th July 18 „ […] 3. […] auch in Transkaukasieen massgebenden Einfluss zu gewinnen. Die Kriegslage zwingt aber …mit einem Mindestmaß an Kräften auszukommen. … Wir müssen alles tun sie [die Ölfelder von BAKU] unbeschädigt in die Hände zu bekommen. … Ölleitung und Bahnlinie sind unter deutsche Oberaufsicht zu bringen … militärische und politische Verwicklung [vermeiden] …“.
13 BIHL: S. 23, „a unique mxiture of improvisation and dilettantism, of enthusiastic persistenc and destzructive ambition, highest personal dedication and a misunderstanding of reality.
14 LUDENDOERFF, Erich: Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918. Berlin 1919, p. 530f.
15 Correctly: Member of an old Franconian noble family belonging to the Nurembergian „Patriziat“.
16 KRESSENSTEIN, p. 77.
17 Order of battle, Cf. BAUMGART, Winfried: Das „Kaspi-Unternehmen“ – Größenwahn Ludendorffs oder Routineplanung des deutschen Generalstabs? Vol. 2. Dokumente zur deutschen militärischen Intervention im Kaukasus
am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges. – In: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge; 18 (1970) 2. – p. 231-278.
18 „Deutschland wird keiner dritten Macht bei etwaigen, militärischen Operationen im Kaukasus […] Unterstützung leisten.“ see. BIHL, p.15.
19 BIHL: p. 43/44. Deputy Secretary of State Berckheim to the Foreign Office, “it would be against our interests if the approach to Central Asia and Persia fell exclusively into Turkish hands and we were dependent on the Osmans for our political and economic activity there. We have spent millions djuring the war to build up a friendly Caucasian state and with it a bridge to Central Asia. This whole effort would have been in vain if the Turks captured Batum and Transcaucasia.“
20 LUDENDORFF, Erich: Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918. Berlin 1919, p. 531. KRESSENSTEIN, p. 60 „If the English did not clear out of Baku, Germany and Fussia should jointly take over. Baku and ist surrounding area should remain Russian and deliver one quarter of the Naphta production. to the central powers.”
21 Cf. appendix KRESSENSTEIN, pp. 101-155.
Litterature:
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